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Scotland‟s improving 
economic performance: 
a long-term comparative 
study 
 
by John McLaren 
 
There has been much comment of late to the effect that 
Scotland‟s historical growth rate has been poor, relative to 
both the UK and to other countries.1  This paper takes a 
contrar y view. Firstly, based on figures for Gross Domestic 
Output (GDP) per capita, acting as a proxy for the rise in the 
standard of living, it argues that Scotland‟s long-term 
growth rate is very similar to that of the UK. Secondly, using 
the same measure, when Scotland‟s performance is 
compared internationally, it is shown to have improved over 
the last three decades relative to other developed econo- 
mies. Thirdly, it is shown that much of the worsening seen 
in Scotland‟s performance, relative to the UK, since the 
mid-90‟s can be attributed in large part to methodological 
inconsistencies in the collection of data for Health and 
Social Work services. The paper concludes by considering 
some of the ways that a better understanding of the 
relative performance of the Scottish economy might be 
achieved and warns of the potential dangers of reinforcing 
a negative view of the Scottish economy. 
 
 
Scottish versus UK growth 
The official Scottish Executive figures2  show that Scot- 
land‟s 30 year GDP growth rate, at 1.6%, is significantly 
lower than that for the UK, at 2.1%. It is true that such a 
variation, 0.5 of a percentage point, over a thirty-year 
period can make a large difference to long-term growth. (At 
1.6% the economy grows by 60% in 30 years, whereas at 
2.1% it grows by almost 90%.) However, it is important to 
understand the reasons for this headline difference of 0.5 
% and how valid it is. 
 
There are a large number of ways that prosperity can be 
measured. Adjustments for many different aspects of 
timing, output and population can be made, and all with 
some validity. In the context of the GDP figures highlighted 
above, there are three adjustments in par ticular that are 
important in getting to a better understanding of Scotland‟s 
per formance. 
 
The first, and most important, adjustment is to take into 
account changes in population. While the original GDP 
figures relate to gross national wealth it is really individual 
personal prosperity that determines well-being. As the 
economic historian Professor Nick Crafts puts it, “Tradition- 
ally, economists have taken the long run or trend rate of 
growth of real GDP per person to be the best available 
measure of an economy‟s achievement in raising living 
standards”.3  This view is endorsed by the OECD, who also 
point out that, rather than GDP growth, it is “growth rates in 
GDP per capita which are more relevant from a national 
living standard perspective”.4 
 
The point of such an adjustment can be illustrated using an 
extreme example. If another Great Plague was to decimate 
the population and reduce it by a third, then national GDP 
would fall, simply because there were fewer people working, 
but personal prosperity need not have fallen, indeed it may 
rise as land and capital are shared amongst fewer people. 
Making adjustments for recent population changes for 
Scotland and the UK is simply taking this effect into 
account, just on a smaller scale, in order to allow for a 
better understanding of how living standards are growing. 
 
There are two other adjustments that can also be influen- 
tial in understanding Scotland‟s true position. The first is in 
relation to oil and gas related activities. The rationale for 
this adjustment is based on the fact that it is not comparing 
like with like if UK Continental Shelf (i.e. North Sea Oil 
(NSO)) activity is included. In National Statistics data, all 
NSO activity is credited to a separate region of the UK (what 
was „the Continental Shelf‟, now called „Extra-Regio‟5). 
Therefore its activity is included in the UK figures but 
excluded, apar t from some service related activities, in the 
figures for Scotland. Were it possible to split NSO activity 
between Scotland and the UK then a comparison could 
properly be made, but data does not allow for this. Hence, 
the comparison excluding NSO activity from the UK data 
gives a truer comparison of relative performance. 
 
The other adjustment is made in relation to which time 
period is being considered. The Executive figures men- 
tioned above cover the period 1973-2001. Table 1 shows 
the figures for other periods, including the longest period 
available, 1963-2001. 
 
Table 1 shows the results from making such adjustments. 
The overall effect is to make the growth rates of Scotland 
and the UK almost identical in the three long run periods 
shown, with the difference never greater than 0.1 of a 
percentage point. In particular, over the longest period 
available, 1963-2001, Scotland‟s growth rate is slightly 
higher. 
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Table1: Gross Value Added in Scotland  and the UK, annual 
average growth rates 
 
All Sectors   All Sectors,  All Sectors, exc 
exc Oil & Gas Oil & Gas, adj for 
pop’n 
Period Sc UK Sc UK Sc UK 
 
1963-2001 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 
1973-2001 1.6 2.1 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 
1983-2001 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.7 2.3 2.4 
 
 
 
Sources: ONS & SE-ELLD, GROS 
 
Note: Figures shown relate to GDP (output based) at constant basic prices 
(GVA under ESA 95) 
 
 
 
 
International comparisons 
GDP per capita can also be used to allow a judgement to be 
made over Scotland‟s relative per formance when looked at 
from an international perspective. Table 2 makes such an 
international comparison by showing growth rates for 
„developed‟ economies over three decades. Within the 
„developed‟ country economies, per formance has been split 
into „high‟, „medium‟ and „low‟, with medium being roughly 
defined as between 1.75 - 2.25 % annual growth. 
 
Table 2 also shows the performance for EU „Cohesion‟ 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and „devel- 
oping‟ countries. The „Cohesion‟ economies were classified 
as such by the EU, as their GDP per capita was significantly 
below (around two-thirds) the EU average. The „developing‟ 
countries, as defined by the UN, include the fast growing 
Far East economies. The purpose of classifying countries in 
this way is to allow for a better comparison of economies at 
similar stages of economic development at the data‟s 
starting point of the early 70‟s, and so to judge which 
countries have per formed well and which badly.6 
 
Table 2 shows that Scotland‟s per formance has been 
improving over time. From a „low growth‟ performer in the 
70‟s it has improved to a „medium growth‟ performer in the 
80‟s and 90‟s. It also moved ahead of the UK in the 90‟s. 
This is quite important as its better performance in the 80‟s 
may have been caused by a close association with the „high 
growth‟ UK economy of that decade. This does not appear 
to have been the case in the 90‟s. 
 
 
Prosperity and population 
It can be argued that national prosperity is also important 
and that a growing population is a healthy sign. But here 
too the data points to an improving Scottish performance 
over the past 30 years. While Scotland‟s population was 
slowly falling from the mid-70‟s to the end of the 80‟s, this 
decline slowed in the 90‟s, there was even a small rise 
between 1989 and 1995. This rise was reflected in the net 
emigration figures for Scotland.7  From the 50‟s through to 
the 80‟s there was large scale net emigration that offset 
the natural increase in the Scottish population. In the 90‟s 
however this position significantly improved and although 
there was still net emigration, it was the lowest figure, by 
decade, for over 150 years. In addition, for the first time in 
over half a century, there were a number of years of net 
immigration. 
 
Besides emigration, the natural change in the Scottish 
population (births – deaths) poses a potential future 
problem for Scotland. Almost uniquely in terms of the EU- 
15, Scotland‟s death rate (11.3 per 1000 population) is 
significantly above its birth rate (10.4 per 1000 population). 
Only Germany is in a similar position. This is not due to a 
low birth rate, Scotland‟s fertility rate is only just below the 
EU-15 average, rather it is caused by an exceptionally high 
death rate, well above that of any of the EU-15. So it may 
be that more attention needs to be paid to lowering the 
death rate than increasing the birth rate. 
 
The United Nations (UN)8  projects that the populations of 
most developed countries will fall over the period to 2050. 
Scotland‟s expected fall, of around 15%, is similar to that 
projected for the Czech Republic and Japan, but lower than 
for Switzerland (-19%) and for Italy (-22%). Even countries 
like Portugal (-10%) and Finland (-5%) are projected to have 
declining populations. 
 
While Scotland‟s population and migration performance 
improved in the 90‟s, there are still problems to be over- 
come. Maintaining or improving the migration performance 
and improving Scotland‟s death rate are key issues. 
However, as the UN figures highlight, in the future there will 
be increasing importance put on improving productivity as 
the route to increasing national wealth. 
 
 
Scotland  versus UK - post 1995 
Looking more closely at Scotland‟s apparently disappointing 
recent growth record, we find that this relative sluggish- 
ness, in comparison to the UK, star ted in the mid-90‟s and 
has accelerated since 2000. 
 
Why has Scotland‟s performance declined in comparison to 
the UK since 1995? This question is particularly puzzling as 
over much of this period the Electronics and Financial 
Services sectors were still booming and Scottish productiv- 
ity was above that of the UK.9 
 
Figures released by the Scottish Executive in April 200310 
shed new light on Scotland‟s recent economic performance, 
particularly in comparison to that of the UK as a whole. 
 
Over the period 1995 to the third quarter of 2002, Scot- 
land‟s economy grew at only two-thirds of the rate of the 
UK, a gap of 6 percentage points in total. However, this 
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recent decline came about during two distinctively different 
time periods, the first from 1995 to 2000 and the second 
from 2000 to 2002Q3. During each period the UK grew by 
3% more than Scotland. The first period saw manufacturing 
growth in Scotland stronger than in the UK but not enough 
to compensate for the slower services growth. In the 
second period the reverse was the case, with the rapid 
decline of manufacturing outweighing a better services 
per formance. 
 
An adjustment should again be made for population change 
over the period in order to get a clearer picture of the 
change in growth of living standards. From 1995 to 2001 
Scotland‟s population fell by 0.8 of a percent, while the 
UK‟s grew by 1.6 %. So, up to 2001, 2.4 % of the 6% gap 
can be accounted for by population change which does not 
impact on GDP per capita. 
 
Table 3 zooms in on this big picture to learn more from the 
detail about relatively good and bad performances. Doing 
so highlights some familiar features and some that are less 
familiar. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Rates of growth of real GDP per capita, (annual averages) 
 
 
Country 
 
Developed economies 
 
1970-1980 
 
Country 
 
1980-1990 
 
Country 
 
1990-2000 
High 
Iceland 
 
5.2 
High 
Japan 
 
3.5 
High 
Nor way (1) 
 
2.8 
Nor way (1) 4.2 Finland 2.7   
Japan 3.3 UK 2.5 Medium  
Belgium 3.2   Australia 2.3 
Finland 3.1 Medium  Holland 2.2 
Italy 3.1 USA 2.2 USA 2.2 
Canada 2.8 Italy 2.2 Scotland 2.1 
France 2.7 Scotland 2.1 UK (1) 2.1 
  Belgium 2.0 Denmark 2.0 
Medium  Norway 2.0 Belgium 1.8 
Holland 2.1 Denmark 1.9 Finland 1.8 
USA 2.1 NZ 1.9 Canada 1.7 
Denmark 1.8 Sweden 1.9   
UK (1) 1.7 France 1.8 Low  
  Australia 1.7 Iceland 1.6 
Low    France 1.4 
Scotland 1.6 Low  Italy 1.4 
Sweden 1.6 Holland 1.6 Sweden 1.4 
Australia 1.5 Iceland 1.6 NZ 1.2 
Switz‟d 1.2 Canada 1.5 Japan 1.1 
NZ 0.5 Switz‟d 1.5 Switz‟d 0.2 
EU defined cohesion (2) 
Greece 
 
 
3.6 
 
 
Ireland 
 
 
3.3 
 
 
Ireland 
 
 
6.4 
Por tugal 3.4 Por tugal 3.1 Por tugal 2.5 
Ireland 3.3 Spain 2.5 Spain 2.5 
Spain 2.5 Greece 0.2 Greece 1.9 
UN defined developing 
Korea 
 
 
5.8 
 
 
Korea 
 
 
7.6 
 
 
Korea 
 
 
5.1 
Mexico 3.3 Mexico -0.3 Mexico 1.7 
 
Source: “The Sources of Economic Growth in the OECD Countries”, OECD, 2003; Scottish Executive; ONS 
 
Notes: (1) UK and Norway measures are both including NSO. Measured as mainland only (i.e. excluding NSO),  growth rates for the 90‟s would fall to 2.0%  and 2.2% 
respectively.  (2) The „Cohesion‟ economies were classified as such by the EU as GDP per capita was significantly below the EU average prior to the reform of Structural 
Funds in the 80‟s. 
Vol.28 No.2, pp.42-48. 
 
 
 
Table 3: A breakdown  of the post 1995  performance for Scotland and the UK 
 
  
1995 
weight 
 
% change 
1995-2002Q3 
 
% 
199 
 
change 
5-2000 
 
% change 
2000-2002Q3 
Industry Sc UK Sc UK Sc UK Sc UK 
 
Total 
 
1000 
 
1000 
 
13 
 
19 
 
12 
 
15 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Agriculture, etc 
 
30 
 
18 
 
0 
 
-7 
 
-1 
 
0 
 
-1 
 
-7 
Mining etc 16 26 9 -3 17 7 -7 -9 
Electricity, gas, water 31 24 5 16 14 11 -8 5 
 
Manufacturing 
 
226 
 
219 
 
-6 
 
-1 
 
16 
 
5 
 
-19 
 
-6 
Chemicals 20 24 32 18 28 12 3 5 
Metals etc 19 25 -8 -11 -2 -4 -6 -7 
Mechanical Engineering 16 19 -6 -13 -5 -10 -1 -3 
Electrical Engineering 60 28 3 11 68 45 -61 -23 
Transpor t Equipment 12 20 -36 13 -9 16 -30 -3 
Food, drink, tobacco 35 29 -10 2 -7 0 -3 2 
Textiles 16 12 -33 -36 -19 -22 -17 -18 
Paper etc 22 28 -16 -1 -2 -1 -14 0 
Other 26 34 -12 -6 -11 -3 -1 -3 
 
Construction 
 
64 
 
52 
 
6 
 
23 
 
9 
 
10 
 
-3 
 
12 
 
Services 
 
632 
 
662 
 
22 
 
29 
 
11 
 
21 
 
10 
 
6 
Wholesale, retail 104 117 31 34 25 23 5 9 
Hotels, restaurants 30 29 13 -4 5 0 8 -3 
Transpor t,Communications 76 80 36 47 16 40 17 5 
Financial Intermedian11   (1) 41 66 57 28 39 21 13 6 
Real Estate,Business 153 186 31 41 10 30 19 8 
Public Admin,Defence 40 61 8 2 7 -1 1 3 
Education 80 56 12 9 9 7 3 2 
Health, Social Work 92 65 -6 25 -10 15 4 8 
Other ser vices 43 43 42 30 18 21 20 7 
 
Sources: ONS, Scottish Executive 
 
 
 
 
Over the period 1995-2000: 
 
-7   Manufacturing grew at over three times the rate in 
Scotland as in the UK, due to the boom in electronics 
and bolstered by a good per formance in the Chemicals 
sector. 
 
-7   However, Scottish services grew at only half the rate of 
UK services. While Scottish Financial Services outgrew 
the UK, the performance in areas like Transport & 
Communications, Real Estate & Business and Health & 
Social Work was much poorer. 
 
-7   Due to the relative importance of manufacturing and 
services to the economy, the weight given to ser vices is 
almost three times that given to manufacturing, this 
led to Scotland‟s underperformance. 
Over the period 2000 to 2002Q3: 
 
-7   Manufacturing has slumped throughout the UK, but at 
three times the UK rate in Scotland. This is largely 
accounted for by the decline in Electronics. 
 
-7   Scottish services outgrew the UK, largely through some 
catch-up in the Transport & Communications and Real 
Estate & Business sectors. However, Health & Social 
Work continued to underperform. 
 
For the period as a whole: 
 
-7   In manufacturing, Scotland‟s best performer has been 
Chemicals, but this has been overwhelmed by the 
relatively poor per formance in Electronics and Trans- 
port Equipment. 
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-7   In services, Financial Services, Hotels & Restaurants 
and Other Services have performed relatively well but 
Transport & Communications, Real Estate & Business 
and Health & Social Work have under-performed. 
 
In trying to explain these relative performances some are 
easier to interpret than others. 
 
-7   The rise and fall of Electronics is well documented, 
although the overall underperformance against the UK 
still comes as a surprise. 
 
-7   The good performance of Chemicals in Scotland is 
unlauded but not unlikely. 
 
-7   Scotland‟s good Financial Services performance has 
also been well recorded. 
 
-7   The slower Scottish growth in Transpor t & Communica- 
tions and Real Estate & Business is not difficult to 
accept, although the reasons for Scotland‟s catch up 
post 2000 are more difficult to interpret. 
 
-7   But the most dif ficult impact to assess is Scotland‟s 
underper formance in the Health and Social Work 
sector. 
 
 
Health and Social Work 
The extent of this sector‟s under-performance, down 6% in 
Scotland while up 25% in the UK, allied with the importance 
of the sector, almost 10% of Scotland‟s economy in 1995, 
has had a very significant impact on Scotland‟s perform- 
ance over the period as a whole. Indeed if this sector had 
grown at the same rate in Scotland as in the UK, half the 
growth gap (3%) since 1995 would disappear. 
 
Why does this disparity arise? The answer comes in two 
par ts. The first relates to a statistical oddity in the 1997 to 
98 figures, where output is recorded as having fallen by 7% 
in one year. Scottish Executive statisticians are aware of 
this anomaly, which relates to recorded employment 
figures. But they have found it difficult to resolve because 
the statistics were recorded five years ago and checking 
this far back presents major difficulties. They are currently 
considering options for making an appropriate adjustment. 
 
The second par t of the answer relates to different method- 
ologies being used. The UK figures are output-based, i.e. 
they record health activity based on a weighted index of the 
number of treatments and operations received by pa- 
tients.12  The Scottish data is input-based, i.e. they record 
health sector activity based on the number of doctors, 
nurses, etc, employed. Scottish Executive statisticians are 
currently considering whether the UK methodology can, and 
should, be replicated for Scotland, in discussion with the 
ONS. 
The impact of using these different measures can be 
estimated by looking at available series of consistent data 
for employment and public health and personal services 
expenditure. 
 
On employment, ONS13  records employment in the Health 
and Social Work (HSW) sector as growing by 9% between 
1995 and 2002 in the UK, while in Scotland growth was 
only 1%. 
 
On public expenditure on health, ONS data14  shows that 
this rose, in real terms, by 36% between 1995 and 2002 
for the UK, and by approximately 25-30%15  for Scotland 
over the same period. 
 
Both the employment and the expenditure measures 
suggest that some, but not all, of the differential in GVA 
performance is valid, but that the different methodologies 
used could account for upto half of the difference remain- 
ing after the 97-98 data adjustment. However, only once 
comparable figures for Scotland are compiled will a clearer 
picture emerge. 
 
It seems likely that, if the Scottish HSW sector figures were 
compiled on the same basis as for the UK, and if popula- 
tion changes were again adjusted for, Scotland‟s overall 
performance would have been similar to the UK‟s between 
1995 and 2000, but still below it between 2000 and 2002, 
although not to the extent shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
The comparative figures in this article illustrate that: 
 
1.    the performance of Scotland and the UK, in terms of 
changes to standards of living (GDP per capita) have 
been very similar in the long run. 
2.    Scotland‟s international performance over time has 
been improving in comparison to other „developed‟ 
economies. 
3.    close inspection of Scotland‟s post-1995 downturn 
relative to the UK shows that there are significant 
methodological inconsistencies in relation to the Health 
and Social Work sector data for Scotland and UK. If 
these were adjusted for it is likely that Scottish stand- 
ards of living maintained its improved position relative 
to the UK up to the end of the decade. Only post 2000 
does there appear to have been a relative downturn. 
 
 
Lessons 
 
What are the lessons that can be drawn from these 
findings? 
One impor tant lesson is that the story of Scotland‟s 
economy in recent times is not a simplistic one of constant 
underperformance. The negative economic story that has 
been told up to now is only one interpretation of the data. 
An alternative view is of a Scotland which has improved its 
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relative rate of growth in living standards and which has 
improved its migration and population per formance. This 
would help to explain why Scotland does not feel poor and 
stagnant and why the labour market is relatively healthy. 
 
It is also impor tant that we do not mix up judgements over 
simple GDP growth with those over GDP per capita growth. 
Spurious claims are often made to the effect that if only 
Scottish GDP had grown at the rate of some other country 
then each Scot would be £X, 000 better off.16  In most 
cases this is comparing apples and pears as the higher 
growth in total GDP has come largely through an increasing 
population, not through an increasing standard of living. 
The two impacts are quite different. For example in the 90‟s 
New Zealand GDP grew at a reasonable 2.6% per annum, 
whereas it‟s GDP per capita grew at a poor 1.2% per 
annum. In other words its population was growing and with 
it overall output, but productivity was low and so standards 
of living grew slowly. 
 
Another important lesson is that the regional GDP figures 
for Scotland are not sufficiently reliable, and require fur ther 
investment in Scottish Executive statistics and statisticians. 
The move to quar terly data and the, imminent, move to 
chain-linking17 are both improvements but the inherited 
problems, some of which have been highlighted here, are 
difficult to revisit. In addition, these measurement problems 
are made worse in the light of wider questions about GDP 
as an economic measure, par ticularly its ability to capture 
quality changes and productivity gains in public services. 
These issues are ver y germane to Scottish data given our 
large public sector. Future improvements in the collection 
and analysis of the data will be crucial in creating a better 
understanding of how our economy is really performing. 
 
 
Actions 
If these are the principal lessons, what are the recom- 
mended actions that would improve matters? 
 
There is an urgent need to improve the analysis and 
understanding of the Scottish economy. This could be 
achieved by the introduction of a Scottish National Develop- 
ment Plan, based on the very successful Irish model.18  The 
objective would not be to plan the economy as a whole but 
to model and forecast it in such a way that the blockage 
points could be identified where government should 
rightfully intervene e.g. housing market/planning, transport 
etc. To do this well would take considerably more resources 
than are currently used in this area, but there would still be 
a relatively minor sum in terms of the Enterprise and 
Lifelong Learning Department‟s budget. 
 
Such a Plan, along with the background work necessary to 
create, evaluate and update it, would lead to a far greater 
number of government economists and statisticians, 
academics, private sector and independent research bodies 
becoming involved in analyzing the Scottish economy. This, 
in turn, would lead to the provision of more and better 
evidence based policy prescriptions for economic and 
government policies. If Scotland had such a set up we 
would not have witnessed the current problems in interpret- 
ing the Health and Social Work figures or the recent 
revisions to Agriculture sector data, as the data would be 
subject to far greater scrutiny. 
 
Until regional UK GDP figures are more reliable it may be 
better to concentrate instead on alternative top line 
indicators, for example, unemployment. This measure is not 
without its own data problems, the two different measures 
reported19  have sometimes moved in different directions in 
recent years and the size of those of working age that are 
registered as long term sick or disabled rather than unem- 
ployed is worryingly high. Nevertheless, it is probably a 
more robust figure at present than GDP and may well be a 
better proxy for well being than GDP per capita. But labour 
market statistics are a relatively static measure of eco- 
nomic per formance, we also need a dynamic measure to 
capture productivity gains, so GDP will remain important, 
but balanced by other measures. 
 
 
Future debate 
In terms of further work needed, even with the findings 
given here there are still a lot of unanswered questions 
thrown up by the data: 
 
-7   Has government policy intervention played a role in the 
improvements seen and if so what does it teach us? 
 
-7   What is at the root of Scotland‟s good services per- 
formance post 2000? 
 
-7   How crucial is it for Scotland‟s population to star t 
growing again, or at least stop falling? 
 
Current political debate in Scotland points to the need to 
link population dynamics to economic per formance. The 
point is accepted by the Scottish Executive. Jack 
McConnell, the First Minister, has stated: “Over recent 
years, Scotland‟s population has been at best stagnant, at 
worst decreasing. Unless we tackle this issue head on, we 
will not be able to meet the growth challenge.”.20  While this 
article questions, to some extent, this conclusion, it is true 
that population trends will become increasingly impor tant 
as the changing age structure within Scotland works against 
output per capita continuing to improve. There are two 
causes of Scotland‟s stagnant population: a high death rate 
and a low (negative) immigration rate. The former needs to 
be tackled through health and social policies. On the latter, 
economists presently accept that the most important driver 
behind migration is economic, especially the hope that by 
moving, individuals will improve their own and their family‟s 
economic circumstances. 21 
 
If the message being put over by our politicians and media 
to those in the job market in Scotland, the UK and over- 
seas, is that the Scottish economy is stagnating, this 
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becomes a negative component of the information set they 
will use to determine where to work, or where to search for 
work. The perception that the Scottish economy performs 
poorly compared to the rest of the UK could become an 
important explanation for the stagnant Scottish population 
and ultimately help to make the prophets of dooms predic- 
tions come true. Yet, as this article has argued, when 
economic performance is measured in terms of rising 
standards of living, Scotland is as good a place in which to 
settle, to work and to bring up children, as the rest of the 
UK. 
 
There are dangers in not being alert to economic slowdown 
and its causes, but equally there are dangers in being 
overly pessimistic, based on par tial analysis. It is for this 
reason that Scotland needs a better, more informed, 
debate over its economic circumstances than has taken 
place in recent times. 
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